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7.1  Introduction 
A large number of studies have shown that wage and earnings inequal- 
ity increased sharply in the United Kingdom since the late 1970s.’ With 
perhaps the exception of the United States, the magnitude of the increase 
in wage inequality was unmatched in any other industrialized countries2 
For example, wage inequality remained relatively stable during the same 
period in the major continental European countries (Germany, France, 
and Italy) while it increased at a more moderate pace in Canada and in 
Japan. This increase in earnings inequality was accompanied by a decrease 
in the earnings gap between men and women. Again, the changes in the 
gender wage gap experienced by the United Kingdom and United States 
appear to be more dramatic than those found in other countries. 
The divergent experiences of  different countries in terms of wage in- 
equality is a major challenge for explanations that focus on changes in the 
relative demand for labor across different skill classes. The most popular 
demand-side explanation for rising wage inequality is that over the last 
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2. See Freeman and Katz (1996) for an overview of the inequality trends in different indus- 
trialized countries. 
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couple of decades, technological change has been biased in favor of skilled 
workers. It is difficult to see, however, why this type of technical change 
should have been more pronounced in the United Kingdom than in coun- 
tries like France and Germany. 
Another possible explanation for the unique wage inequality experience 
of the United Kingdom is that since 1979 the institutional structures of the 
U.K. labor market changed dramatically. Union decline, falls in public- 
sector employment, contracting-out, and competitive tendering of some 
public-sector services resulted in changes in the way pay was formally set. 
Wages councils (who set minimum rates of pay in some low-paying and fe- 
male-dominated industries) were weakened and finally abolished in 1993. 
Some women would have benefited from the increase in scope of legislation 
concerning sex discrimination and equal pay, however. The depth and cov- 
erage of employment protection legislation was reduced, basically making 
it easier for firms to sack their workers. Changes to the social security and 
welfare system may have  affected work  incentives, possibly increasing 
competitive pressure on wages at the bottom part of the distribution and 
changing the composition of the workforce. 
The main question we ask in the paper is whether these reforms in the in- 
stitutional structure of the labor market contributed to the increase in in- 
equality in the United Kingdom. On the one hand, a quick comparison of 
the experiences of different European countries suggests that the answer to 
this question is yes. Countries like France and Germany experienced nei- 
ther the dramatic labor market reforms nor the sharp increase in wage in- 
equality that the United Kingdom experienced over the last two  decade^.^ 
On the other hand, it is possible that the United Kingdom would have 
diverged from the experience of the rest  of Europe without  any policy 
changes, given the existing differences in the structure of collective bar- 
gaining and the educational and training systems. It is therefore difficult to 
identify the precise effect of these policy reforms through a broad compar- 
ison of the leading European economies. 
Comparisons between the United Kingdom and the United States may 
be more fruitful, however, for at least three reasons. First, the U.S. and 
U.K. labor markets of the late 1990s are very similar. Wage setting where 
unions are present is decentralized and unions have little influence over pay 
in the private sector. In neither country is there a wide-ranging system of 
vocational education and training. Formal skill acquisition occurs at school 
or at university rather than on the  Second, given that it is possible to 
3. See also Giles et al. (1998) for a comparison between the United Kingdom and West Ger- 
many over the 1980s. 
4. This is not to say there is no on-the-job training in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, but merely that training schemes which give workers accredited transferable skills are 
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think of the institutional changes in the United Kingdom as transforming 
its labor market in a more “U.S. style,” the United States is a natural bench- 
mark  for assessing the impact  of these reforms. Third, changes in the 
United Kingdom (as discussed in section 7.3) were more likely to affect 
men, while changes in the United States (basically the decline in the real 
value of the U.S. minimum wage between 1979 and 1990) were more likely 
to affect women. A comparison of the difference in the difference in trends 
between men and women across the two countries may help to disentangle 
the effect of these institutional changes from other country-specific trends 
as well as trends that are common to both countries. The primary goal of 
this paper is to examine this in more detail. 
The plan of the paper is the following. In section 7.2, we  describe the 
data and present descriptive statistics on the evolution of the distribution 
of wages in the United Kingdom and the United States during the 1980s 
and 1990s.  In section 7.3 we look directly at the role of unionization, privat- 
ization, and the minimum wage in explaining the key differences between 
the evolution of wage inequality in the two countries. In section 7.4, we pre- 
sent some qualifications and extensions to the main results of section 7.3. 
We conclude in section 7.5. 
7.2  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
7.2.1  Data Sources 
For the United Kingdom we use a multiple-data  set approach as there is 
no one data set which is ideal for our purpose. More precisely, we compute 
the basic trends in wage inequality using the Family Expenditure Survey 
(FES) for 1978 to 1996  supplemented with the autumnal Labor Force Sur- 
vey (LFS) for 1997-1999  and, in few cases, by the General Household Sur- 
vey (GHS). We analyze the effect of unionization and public-sector affilia- 
tion on wage inequality by comparing the 1983 GHS and the 1998 LFS. 
For the United States we use data from the outgoing rotation sample of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS). A more detailed discussion of all the 
data sets we use is given in the appendix. 
7.2.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Throughout this paper, we focus on the evolution of overall measures of 
(hourly) wage inequality such as the standard deviation, interpercentiles 
range such as the 90- 10 wage ratio, and the whole density of wages. This fo- 
cus is deliberate given our interest for the role of economic reforms and la- 
bor market institutions on the wage distribution. A large number of stud- 
ies have stressed the importance of supply, demand, and skilled-biased 
technical change in the evolution of wage differentials across education 278  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
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 group^.^ These wage differentials represent, however, only a small fraction 
of total wage variability across individuals. More importantly, previous re- 
search has shown that the effect of factors such as  unions and the minimum 
wage are best captured by modeling the whole distribution of wages rather 
than focusing only on the more standard wage differentials by age or edu- 
cation (see DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996).  For the sake of complete- 
ness, however, we also present below a few education- and age-related wage 
differentials and a standard between- versus within-group variance de- 
composition. 
Figure 7.1 plots the evolution of the median and the 10th and 90th per- 
centiles of male and female wages in the United Kingdom and the United 
States between 1978 and 1999 (1978 to 1998 in the United Kingdom, 1979 
to 1999 in the United States), normalized to 100 in 1979.6  The paths of the 
medians  indicate very  different  patterns  of  wage  growth  for  different 
groups. In both the United Kingdom and the United States, median wages 
of women increase substantially relative to those of men. This translates 
into a substantial decline in the gender wage gap (at the median) as re- 
ported in figure 7.2. This finding is consistent with other U.S. and U.K. 
5. See. for example, Katz and Murphy (1992) for the United States, Schmitt (1996) for 
Britain, and Freeman and Needels (1993) and Card and Lemieux (2001) for international 
comparisons among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. 
6.  In figures 7.1 and 7.3 and table 7.1, we have adjusted the 1997 and 1998 data to ensure 
there  is no  discontinuity between the 1996 FES and the 1997 LFS due to differences in the sur- 
vey instruments. See the appendix for more details. Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage Inequality  279 
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Fig. 7.2  Gender wage gap, United Kingdom and United States 
studies such as Harkness (1996) and Blau (1998). Interestingly, the change 
in the wage gap is very similar in the two countries. Median female wages 
have increased from about 64 percent to 73 percent of the male median in 
the United Kingdom and from 64 percent to 75 percent in the United 
States. A second important difference is that real wages grow much faster 
in the United Kingdom than in the United States during this period. For 
instance, the median of US. male real wage declined between  1979 and 
1998 compared to a 25 percent growth in the United Kingdom.’ 
Figure 7.1 also indicates that wage inequality increased for all four 
groups during this period. In all four cases, the 90th percentile grows rela- 
tive to the median. A closer examination of the figure indicates, however, 
that most of the growth in inequality actually occurred during the 198Os, 
while inequality remained more stable in the 1990s. Figure 7.1 also shows 
that inequality increased more for some groups than others. For example, 
the increase in wage inequality over the whole sample period is much less 
pronounced for men in the United States than in the United Kingdom. 
These trends in wage inequality are more readily seen in figure 7.3, which 
reports the evolution of both the 90-10 differential and the standard devi- 
ation of log wages. Both the standard deviation and the 90-10 differential 
show the same steep increase in wage inequality in the 1980s, followed by 
more modest growth in the 1990s. 
7. A similar difference has been noticed in other comparisons between the United States 
and France (Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux 1999) or Germany (Beaudry and Green 2003). 
Beaudry and Green suggest that differences in the accumulation of  physical capital per 
capita, which grew much faster in Germany than in the United States during this period, may 
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Beyond these broad similarities in the pattern and growth of wage in- 
equality in the United Kingdom and the United States, figures 7.1 and 7.3 
also illustrate some important differences between the two countries. The 
slowdown of inequality growth in the 1990s is much more marked in the 
United States, particularly for women. Over the 1980s the increase in both 
the 90-10 differential and the standard deviation of female wages is larger 
in the United States than in the United Kingdom. In the 1990s the oppo- 
site is true. In addition, the level of wage inequality, as measured by the 
standard deviation and the 90-10 differential, is systematically lower for 
men than women in the United Kingdom, while the opposite is true in the 
United States. Furthermore, the figure shows that while wage inequality 
grows faster for men than for women in the United Kingdom, the opposite 
is true in the United States. 
One way of summarizing the data is to say that the extent of wage in- 
equality has converged in the two countries over the last twenty years. 
While there were important differences in the level and pattern of wage in- 
equality across gender and countries in the late 1970s, much of these differ- 
ences have vanished by the late 1990s. Male wage inequality in the United 
Kingdom has caught up to the level of female wage inequality and is mov- 
ing closer to the level of male inequality in the United States. 
The convergence in wage inequality in the two countries is shown more 
explicitly in table 7.  I, which reports several measures of inequality for men Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage Inequality  281 
Table 7.1  Measures of (log) Wage Inequality in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, 1979-1998 
1979-  1989  1989-1998  1979-1998 
1979  1989  1998  Change  Change  Change 

































A. United Kingdom, Men 
0.529  0.550  0.121 
0.630  0.640  0.118 
1.159  1.189  0.239 
0.464  0.501  0.088 
B. United Kingdom, Women 
0.494  0.576  0.095 
0.717  0.693  0.119 
1.211  1.269  0.213 
0.486  0.503  0.077 
C  United States, Men 
0.737  0.688  0.087 
0.639  0.699  0.087 
1.376  1.386  0.175 
0.527  0.529  0.068 
D.  United States, Women 
0.631  0.567  0.192 
0.642  0.728  0.067 
1.273  1.295  0.258 

































Notes: Based on hourly wages of wage and salary workers aged twenty-three to fifty-nine 
earning between El and E30 per hour (E1996) in the United Kingdom, and between $2.50 and 
$63.00 an hour ($1996) in the United States. United States data are from the outgoing rota- 
tion group files of the CPS. Measures of wage dispersion for the United Kingdom in 1979 and 
1989 are three-year averages from the FES for 1978-1980  and 1988-1990,  respectively. Mea- 
sures of wage dispersion for 1998 are computed using data from the autumn LFS. Abbrevia- 
tions are explained in text. 
and women in 1979, 1989, and 199tL8  For example, the 0.084 U.S.-U.K. dif- 
ference in the male standard deviation in 1979 (0.460 in the United States 
vs. 0.376 in the United Kingdom) declines to 0.063 in 1989 and 0.028 in 
1998, which is only a third of the original difference. By contrast, the US.- 
U.K.  difference in  the female  standard  deviation  is  relatively modest 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
As is well known, the standard deviation and the 90-10 wage differential 
are two standard measures of wage inequality that capture different fea- 
tures of the wage distribution. For example, changes in the wage distribu- 
8. The statistics reported for 1979 and 1989 in the United Kingdom are averages for 1978 
to 1980, and 1988 to 1990, respectively. 282  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
a. Men  b. Women 
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Fig. 7.4  Density of log wages in the United Kingdom in 1996 pounds 
tion above the 90th percentile affect the standard deviation but not the 90- 
10 differential. A more general way of looking at what happens in the dis- 
tribution of wages is to plot the whole distribution of wages. In this light, 
figure 7.4 shows kernel density estimates of the distribution of (log) wages 
for men and women in the United Kingdom in 1979, 1989, and 1998. For 
both men and women, there is clear visual evidence that the wage distribu- 
tion becomes increasingly unequal over time. In both cases, the density in 
the middle of the distribution declines while it increases in the tails. 
Figure 7.4 also shows that the female wage distribution  is positively 
skewed in all years. The distribution of male wages is also skewed, but to a 
much smaller extent. This skewness in the U.K. wage distribution is also il- 
lustrated in table 7.1, which shows that the 90-50 wage differential is sys- 
tematically larger than the 50-10 differential. The situation is quite differ- 
ent in the United States. Figure 7.5, panel A, shows that the male wage 
distribution in 1979 was in fact negatively skewed, though it becomes much 
more symmetric over time. As in the case in the United Kingdom, there is 
clear evidence of  an overall increase in wage inequality. The density of 
wages declines in the middle of the distribution and increases in the tails. 
These qualitative changes in the shape of the U.S. male distribution are 
confirmed in table 7.1, which shows that the 50-10 wage differential is sub- 
stantially larger than the 90-50 differential in 1979. By 1998, however, the 
distribution is more or less symmetric since the 90-50 and 50-10 differen- 
tials are comparable. By contrast, the U.S. female wage distribution, shown 
in figure 7.5, panel B, is positively skewed, and the 90-50 wage differential 
is systematically larger than the 50-10 differential. The increase in overall 
inequality is perhaps clearer for U.S. women than for other groups because 
average wages are relatively stable over time. As a result, panel B of figure 
7.5 clearly shows that the density declines in the middle of the distribution 
but increases in the tails. The same pattern is not as clearly seen for other 
groups because average wages shift substantially over time. 
In summary, the different pieces of evidence all suggest that the U.K. 
wage distribution is becoming increasingly similar to the U.S. wage distri- Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage Inequality  283 
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Fig. 7.5  Density of log wages in the United States in 1996 dollars 
bution. This is particularly clear in the case of men, for which the shape of 
the wage distribution (skewness) and the extent of inequality (standard de- 
viation and 90-10 differential) were quite different in 1979. Most of these 
differences had vanished by 1998. There is also a convergence between the 
U.K. and U.S. female wage distributions, though differences were perhaps 
more subtle in 1979 than in the case of men. The 1979 density in the United 
Kingdom has a well defined single peak while there is a relatively flat sec- 
tion in the middle of the U.S. distribution. By contrast, the shapes of the 
U.K. and U.S. distributions look much more similar in 1998. 
Since real wages were initially lower but grew faster in the United King- 
dom than in the United States, both the level and the distribution of wages 
have converged. One simple way of representing this overall wage conver- 
gence between the two countries is to show to which percentile of the U.K. 
real wage distribution corresponds a given percentile of the U.S. real wage 
distribution.‘’ Panel A of figure 7.6 illustrates these “Q-Q” plots for men 
in 1979, 1989, and 1998.’O The figure shows, for example, that the median 
wage for U.S.  men is equivalent to the 90th percentile of the U.K. wage dis- 
tribution in 1979. The percentile of the U.K. wage distribution correspon- 
ding to the US. median drops to the 70th in 1989 and to the 60th in 1998 
as U.K. real wages keep catching up to U.S. levels. Overall, the relationship 
between U.K. and U.S. wage percentiles gets increasingly close to a 45- 
degree line, which illustrates dramatically the convergence between the dis- 
9. We  use the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) pur- 
chasing power parity exchange rates for 1996 (f0.65  per dollar) to convert the U.K. real wages 
(in 1996 pounds) into 1996 US. dollars. 
10. To make the figure more informative, we have normalized the scales using the inverse of 
the cumulative normal distribution. The reason for doing so is that if the distribution of (log) 
wages is approximately normal in both countries, U.K. percentiles (in the normalized scale) 
are a linear function of U.S. percentiles and the variance of U.K. wages is lower if this slope 
is smaller than 1. The same interpretation of the “un-normalized” Q-Q plots applies only if 
the (log) wage distributions are approximately uniform. It is clear from figures 7.4 and 7.5, 
however, that the empirical wage distributions arc much closer to a normal than to a uniform 
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tribution of real wages in the two countries. The same basic pattern of wage 
convergence is also observed for women in panel B of figure 7.6. 
7.2.3  Wage Dispersion between and within Groups of Workers 
Our focus on overall wage inequality is different from the bulk of the lit- 
erature that has mostly focused on the evolution of wage differentials be- 
tween different “skill groups” such as college and high school workers. For 
the sake of comparability with this literature, we present a set of standard 
age and education wage differentials  for the United Kingdom and the 
United States in table 7.2. These differentials  are computed by running Table 7.2  Standard Wage Differentials and Between- and Within-Group Variance of Wages in 
the United Kingdom and the United States, 1979-1998 
1979-1989  1989-1998  1979-1998 
1979  1989  1998  Change  Change  Change 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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A. United Kingdom, Men 
0.248  0.288  0.246  0.040 
0.231  0.242  0.375  0.01  1 
0.191  0.245  0.308  0.054 
0.0386  0.0591  0.0781  0.0205 
0.1000  0.1427  0.1730  0.0427 
B. United Kingdom, Women 
0.208  0.292  0.243  0.084 
0.520  0.400  0.490  -0.120 
0.014  0.009  0.092  -0.005 
0.0480  0.0759  0.0850  0.0279 
0.1119  0.1562  0.1682  0.0443 
C. United States, Men 
0.221  0.247  0.285  0.026 
0.216  0.342  0.416  0.126 
0.044  0.091  0.157  0.047 
0.297  0.357  0.325  0.060 
0.0496  0.0833  0.0934  0.0337 
0.1617  0.1901  0.1903  0.0284 
D.  United States, Women 
0.175  0.251  0.274  0.076 
0.260  0.418  0.481  0.158 
0.170  0.180  0.203  0.010 
0.078  0.175  0.230  0.097 
0.0323  0.0715  0.0809  0.0392 













































Notes; Based on hourly wages of wage and salary workers aged twenty-three to fifty-nine earning be- 
tween &1  and &30  per hour (E1996) in the United Kingdom, and between $2.50 and $63.00 an hour 
($1996) in the United States. United States data are from the outgoing rotation group files of the CPS. 
Measures ofwage dispersion for the United Kingdom in 1979  and 1989  are three-year averages from the 
GHS for 1978-1980 and 1988-1990, respectively. Measures of wage dispersion for 1998 are computed 
using data from autumn LFS. The decomposition of the variance of log wages between and within 
groups is carried over by estimating log wage regressions with a set of regional dummies (ten regions and 
London in the United Kingdom, nine regions and SMSA status in the United States), a dummy variable 
for marital status, and a set of education dummies (seven in the United Kingdom, five in the United 
States) fully interacted with a fourth-degree polynomial in age as regressors. United States models also 
include dummy variables for race and veteran status. Abbreviations are explained in text. 286  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
regressions of log wages on a set of age and education dummies. We use the 
same set of age dummies for the age groups 23-29,30-39,40-49,  and 50- 
59 in both countries. For the United States, we use a set of five education 
categories: high school dropouts, high school graduates, some college, col- 
lege graduates, and college post-graduates. 
Unfortunately, the information on educational  achievement is quite lim- 
ited in the FES samples. The wage differentials reported in table 7.2 for 
1979 and 1989 are thus computed using the GHS, while the LFS is used 
for 1998.” To get large enough samples, we pool the 1978, 1979, and 1980 
GHS to compute wage differentials for 1979, and the 1988,1989, and 1990 
GHS  for 1989. We construct six education categories for the GHS  and the 
LFS: no qualification,  some vocational  qualifications  (low, middle, and 
high), A-0  level qualifications, and university graduates. We also decom- 
pose the variance of wages into a between- and within-group component 
by running wage regressions on a rich set of individual characteristics.I2 
With few exceptions, the different measures of wage dispersion reported 
in table 7.2 show trends similar to those reported earlier for overall wage 
inequality. For instance, there is generally a more marked slowdown in in- 
equality growth in the United States than in the United Kingdom during 
the 1990s. Another difference between the two countries is that the wage 
gap between college-educated (university) and high school-educated  (A- 
0 level) workers  has expanded  faster in the United States than in the 
United Kingd~m.’~  This explains why a larger fraction of the growth in in- 
equality comes from the between-group component in the United States. 
A related point is that, in absolute terms, the growth in between-group 
inequality is more or less similar for men and women in the two countries. 
The differential evolution in inequality  for men and women highlighted 
previously is almost entirely driven by changes in within-group inequality, 
which increases more for men than women in the United Kingdom, while 
the opposite is true in the United States. While explanations for changes in 
the structure of wages based on the supply and demand for different skill 
groups have natural implications for between-group inequality, they have 
few testable implications for within-group inequality. Therefore, it is un- 
likely that these explanations could account for the differential evolution 
11. As discussed in the appendix, the GHS  is not an ideal data source because weekly hours 
of work are not measured consistently over time. Despite this shortcoming,  however, the FES 
and the GHS show quite similar increascs in the standard deviation of log hourly wages dur- 
ing the 1980s. Table 7.1 indicates that between 1979 and 1989, the standard deviation com- 
puted using the FES increased by 0.088 and 0.077 for men and women, respectively. Compa- 
rable numbers from the GHS are 0.081 and 0.083, respectively. 
12. The variables used in log wage regressions are a set of regional dummies  (ten regions and 
London in the United Kingdom; nine regions and standard metropolitan statistical areas sta- 
tus in the United States), a dummy variable for marital status, and a set ofeducation dummies 
(seven in the United Kingdom, five in the United States) fully interacted with a fourth-degree 
polynomial in age. The US.  models also include dummy variables for race and veteran status. 
13.  Card and Lemieux (2001) report a similar finding. Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage Inequality  287 
of inequality among men and women in the two countries. This provides 
an additional motivation for focusing on the role of labor market reforms 
and institutional changes in the remainder of this paper. 
7.3  Effect of Reforms and Institutions on the Distribution of Wages 
We have just shown that the structure of wages appears to have con- 
verged for the two countries. In the introduction we  highlighted the fact 
that institutional structures have also converged. On the one hand, U.K. 
men were relatively better  “protected  from inequality” than their  U.S. 
counterparts in the late 1970s because of the strength of U.K. trade unions. 
On the other hand, U.K. women were not as well protected from inequal- 
ity because of the lack of a comprehensive national minimum wage policy. 
These two observations may potentially explain the difference in the evo- 
lution of  male and female wage inequality in the two countries between 
1979 and 1998. We now examine this view in more detail. 
7.3.1  Minimum Wages 
The minimum wage has been closely linked to the expansion in wage in- 
equality in the United States during the 1980s. As shown in figure 7.7, the 
real value of the minimum wage fell sharply between 1979 and 1989 before 
recovering somewhat in the 1990s.I4  DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) 
and Lee (1999) argue that the decline in real value of the U.S. minimum 
wage accounts for most of the increase in wage inequality in the lower end 
of the distribution during the 1980s. This is especially the case for women, 
who are more likely than men to earn wages at or close to the minimum 
wage. 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had no national minimum 
wage until 1999. Instead, workers in some low-paying industries (e.g., cloth- 
ing, retail, and catering) were covered by  institutions called wage coun- 
cils, which set industry-level minima. These were reformed in  1986 and 
abolished in 1993 (in Great Britain). In 1993 some 2.5 million workers were 
covered. The key distinction between the United States and the United 
Kingdom  in  1979 was in the heterogeneity  of coverage. In the United 
Kingdom, some low-paid workers had no protection at all, and the levels 
of protection varied not only across industries but also (until 1986) within 
industries. In terms of changes over time, the United States experienced 
a steady fall in the minimum wage over the 1980s affecting all workers in 
14. Between 1979 and 1981, the nominal minimum wage increased from $2.9 to $3.35 but 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased even faster. The real value of the minimum wage 
fell sharply as the nominal value of the minimum wage remained at $3.35 until April 1990, 
when it was raised to $3.80, and to $4.25 in April 1991. Inflation eroded once again the value 
of the real minimum wage until October 1996 and September 1997, when the minimum wage 
was increased successively to $4.75 and $5.15, respectively. 288  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
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Fig. 7.7  US.  federal minimum wage, 1996 dollars 
the same way, unlike the United Kingdom, where there was no such change. 
In the  1990s the U.S. minimum rose in real and nominal terms and we 
should expect this to halt the growth in wage inequality. We should also 
expect to see a small increase in wage inequality for U.K. women  after 
1993. 
The trends, reported in figure 7.1 and table 7.1, are broadly consistent 
with the findings of the previous literature. During the 1980s, the 50-10 
wage  differential  expanded  faster  for  U.S.  women  than for  any  other 
groups. The visual effect of the minimum wage can also be seen in Figure 
7.5, panel B,  where the lower end of the female wage distribution is dis- 
torted by the (relatively) high value of the minimum wage. The shape of the 
wage distribution evolves toward a more regular bell-shaped distribution 
in 1989 as the minimum wage becomes increasingly less binding. The lower 
end of the distribution becomes slightly more compressed in the 1990s as 
the minimum wage starts increasing again. By contrast, there is much less 
evidence of a visual effect of the minimum wage for men.I5 
Both figure 7.1 and table 7.1 also show that the 50-10 wage differential 
started narrowing in the United States during the 1990s as the real value of 
the minimum wage started increasing again. The fact that the 50-10 wage 
differential expands in 1980s but narrows again in the 1990s in the United 
States, while it keeps expanding in the United Kingdom, illustrates the im- 
15. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) find a clearer impact of the minimum wage for 
all men aged sixteen to sixty-four. We miss a substantial fraction of minimum-wage workers 
in this paper by focusing only on workers above the age of twenty-two. Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage Inequality  289 
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Fig. 7.8  Minimum wage and U.K.-U.S. female variance gap 
portant role of the minimum wage for wage inequality. Figures 7.1 and 7.3 
also show a small acceleration of the increase in female wage inequality in 
the United Kingdom in the mid-1990s. 
Broader measures of wage inequality, such as the standard deviation and 
the 90-10 differential, illustrate the same qualitative story for women. Both 
of these measures expand faster in the United States than in the United 
Kingdom during the 1980s, while the opposite happens in the 1990s (table 
7.1). The decline and subsequent recovery of the real value of the minimum 
wage in the United States is a natural explanation for this set of facts. 
We explore this explanation in more detail in figure 7.8, which shows the 
evolution of the U.K.-U.S. difference in the variance of female wages along 
with a measure of the pressure that the U.S. minimum wage exerts on the 
US. variance of wages.I6  This measure of minimum-wage pressure is com- 
puted using a “tail-pasting’’  procedure suggested by DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux (1996). The procedure relies on the assumption that if the real 
minimum wage had remained at its highest (1979) value throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, the distribution of wages at or below the 1979 minimum 
wage would have remained the same as in 1979. Under this assumption, 
a counterfactual distribution can be computed in year t by replacing the 
part of the year-r wage distribution at or below the 1979 minimum wage by 
the corresponding section of the 1979 wage distribution. Our measure of 
16. Because of smaller sample sizes, we smooth the U.K. variance of wages using a three- 
year moving average before computing the U.K.-US. difference in the variance of wages. 290  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
minimum-wage pressure is the difference between this counterfactual and 
the actual variance of wages in each year, normalized to zero in 1979.’’ 
Figure 7.8 shows that our measure of minimum wage pressure more or 
less follows the U-shaped pattern of the real minimum wage illustrated in 
figure 7.7. While the difference between the U.K. and the U.S. variances fol- 
lows a more irregular pattern, the series is  also U-shaped as inequality 
grows slower in the United Kingdom than in the United States in the 1980s, 
while the opposite happens in the 1990s. 
Interestingly, a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression indicates 
that the minimum-wage-pressure  variable has a positive and significant 
effect on the U.K.-U.S. gap in the variance of female wages. The estimated 
coefficient is 0.78 with a standard error of 0.20, which means we cannot re- 
ject the null hypothesis that a given change in the variance of U.S. wages in- 
duced by a change in the minimum wage has a one-to-one impact on the 
U.K.-U.S. gap in the variance of wages. This finding is robust to the inclu- 
sion of a linear time trend, which is not statistically significant. However, 
only about half of the variation in the variance gap can be explained by the 
minimum-wage-pressure variable (the R-squared of the regression is 0.46). 
The results nevertheless confirm that the U.S. minimum wage goes a long 
way toward explaining the relative evolution of female wage inequality in 
the two countries. 
One interesting conjecture is that the introduction  of the U.K. mini- 
mum wage in 1999 may have contributed to the U.K.-U.S. convergence in 
wage inequality and labor market regulations for women in the same way 
that U.K. de-unionization potentially did for men. Figure 7.3 shows that, 
though the gap has declined over time, wage inequality was still larger for 
U.K. women than U.K. men in 1998. This raises the obvious question of 
whether the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in  1999 was 
enough to tilt the balance in the U.S. direction by  pushing U.K. female 
wage inequality below U.K. male wage inequality. 
In table 7.3, we perform some simple simulations using the 1998 LFS to 
gauge the potential effect of the minimum wage on male and female in- 
equality in the United Kingdom. In these simulations, we assume that only 
a fraction of workers earning less than the  1999 minimum wage of 3.6 
pounds would have earned at least 3.6 pounds if this minimum wage had 
prevailed in 1998.  As is well known, because of imperfect coverage, lack of 
compliance, or measurement error in self-reported wages, a substantial 
17. We compute the counterfactual distribution by replacing all year-t observations at or 
below the 1979 minimum wage by corresponding 1979 observations, and reweight observa- 
tions so that the total number of (weighted) observations remains unchanged. For the proce- 
dure to be valid, we  need to assume that there are no employment or spillover effects due to 
the minimum wage. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Lee (1999) argue that, if any- 
thing, these assumptions tend to understate the true impact of the minimum wage on the dis- 
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Table 7.3  Simulated and Actual Effect of the 1999 Minimum Wage on the U.K. 
Wage Distribution 
Actual  Simulated 1998 with  Actual  Actual with New 
1998  f3.60 Minimum Wage  1999  Hourly Wage Data 




90-10 log wage 
5th percentile 
10th percentile 
90-10 log wage 
Standard deviation 













































Notes: Statistics computed using data from the 1998 and 1999 autumn LFS for wage and 
salary workers aged twenty-three to fifty-nine earning between E1.06 and f31.8 per hour (be- 
tween 51 and f30 in f1996). The simulated effect of the minimum wage (column [2]) is ob- 
tained by assuming that two-thirds of workers earning less than f3.6 in the autumn of 1998 
would have earned exactly the 1999 National Minimum Wage of f3.6 if the 1999 National 
Minimum Wage had prevailed in 1998. The wage of the other third of subminimum workers 
are assumed to be unaffected by the minimum wage. In column (4), the (new) direct informa- 
tion on hourly wage rates is used instead of average hourly earnings whenever available. 
fraction of workers report wages that are below the minimum wage. On the 
basis  of  recent estimates provided  by  the Office of National  Statistics 
(ONS), we assume that two-thirds of workers who report wages below E3.6 
in 1998 would have earned at least E3.6 if the minimum wage had prevailed 
in that year.'* We carry the simulations by randomly picking two-thirds of 
workers earning less than E3.6 and increasing their wages to E3.6, while 
leaving wages of other subminimum-wage workers ~nchanged.'~ 
The results of these simulations are reported in column (2) of table 7.3. 
The table shows the 5th and 10th percentiles of the wage distribution, as 
well as the 90-10 differential and the standard deviation of log wages. The 
18. Using data from the New Earnings Survey (NES) and improved wage data from the 
LFS, the ONS estimates that, relative to 1998, the fraction of workers aged twenty-two and 
older earning less than f3.6 declined by 4.6 percentage points in 1999 and 5.7 percentage 
points in early 2000. The latter figure represents about two-thirds of the fraction of workers 
we observed below f3.6 in 1998. 
19. As discussed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), we probably understate the im- 
pact of the minimum wage in these simulations by ignoring possible spillover or disemploy- 
ment effects. Lee (1999) confirms that minimum-wage impacts become indeed larger when 
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simulated impact of the minimum wage is the difference between the sim- 
ulated value of these wage statistics in column (2) and their actual value for 
1998 in column (1). The results for men in part A indicate that the mini- 
mum wage has no effect on either the 5th or the 10th percentile of the wage 
distribution. This simply reflects the fact that less than 5 percent of men 
earned less than E3.6 in 1998 (the 5th percentile is 3.84). Nevertheless, we 
estimate that introducing a E3.6 minimum wage would have decreased the 
standard deviation of log wages by 0.014. 
As expected, the minimum wage has a much larger effect for women. 
Part B of table 7.3 shows that introducing a g3.6 minimum wage would 
have raised both the 5th and the 10th percentiles to 3.6. This effect is strong 
enough to lower the 90-10 differential by 0.054 and the standard deviation 
by 0.030. As a result, both the 90-10 differential and the standard deviation 
become lower for women than for men. 
With the recent release of the 1999 LFS data, it is also possible to see 
how the actual distribution of wages has evolved with the introduction of 
the minimum wage. Column (3) shows the various wage statistics for 1999 
using the same average hourly earnings measure as in 1998.20  Since March 
1999, however, the LFS has started asking directly the hourly rate of pay of 
hourly rated workers, just like in the U.S. CPS. In column (4),  the direct in- 
formation on hourly wages is used for all workers who answer this ques- 
tion. In both the United Kingdom and the United States, the effect of the 
minimum wage on direct measures of hourly wage rates is much clearer be- 
cause of the measurement error in average hourly earnings measures.*' 
One difficulty with a straight comparison of the wage distribution be- 
tween  1999 and 1998 is that factors other than the minimum wage may 
have also changed the wage distribution during this period. For instance, 
male wage inequality remains more or less constant during this period, 
suggesting that other sources of increasing wage inequality may be offset- 
ting the impact of the new minimum wage. If these other factors have the 
same impact for men and women, however, a more accurate measure of 
minimum wage impacts is obtained by contrasting the evolution of wage 
inequality for men relative to women. 
The male-female differences in wage inequality are shown in part C.  In 
1998, there  was  little  difference  in  wage  inequality  between  men  and 
women (column [I]). According to the simulation reported in column (2), 
wage inequality should now be larger for men than women with the intro- 
duction of the National Minimum Wage. Depending on  which wage mea- 
20. Workers are asked to report earnings for their usual pay period (weekly, biweekly, 
monthly, etc.) in the LFS. Wage rates are then computed by dividing earnings by hours over 
the relevant period. 
21. In the 1999 LFS, only 0.4 percent of workers earn exactly E3.6 per hour when average 
hourly earnings are used. This proportion jumps to 2.5 percent when direct measures of the 
hourly wage rate are used whenever available. Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage Inequality  293 
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sure is used for  1999, the male-female difference in inequality is either 
slightly smaller (column [3]) or larger (column [4]) than predicted by the 
simulation. 
Overall, these results confirm our conjecture that the introduction of the 
national minimum wage in 1999 was enough to pull U.K. female wage in- 
equality below U.K. male wage inequality. The new minimum wage has, 
therefore, contributed to the convergence in wage distribution between the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
7.3.2  Unionization 
The weakening of the power of U.K. unions throughout the 1980s and 
1990s can be illustrated by the strong decline in the rate of union member- 
ship. Figure 7.9 shows that the rate of union membership declined by more 
than 20 percentage points between 1979 and 1998. Though the decline is 
slightly more pronounced between 1979 and 1989, the rate of union mem- 
bership keeps declining up to the late 1990s. By contrast, the decline in the 
U.S. rate of union membership is more modest and concentrated in the 
1979 to 1984 period. As a result, the difference in the rate of union mem- 
bership between the two countries shrinks from about 28 percentage points 
in 1979 to about 16 percentage points in 1998. This change has affected 
men more than women. Over the I990s, for example, male union density 
fell from 44 percent in 1989 to 31 percent in 1999, while female union den- 
sity fell from 33 percent to 29 percent over the same period (Department 
of Trade and Industry). 
Starting with Freeman (1980, 1982) and Metcalf (1977, 1982), several 
studies have clearly established that unions tend to reduce wage inequal- 
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Fig. 7.9  Union membership rate, United Kingdom and United States 294  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
ity among U.S. and U.K. males. Studies have also established  that de- 
unionization has contributed to the increase in wage inequality in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom during the 1980s.’* By contrast, the 
existing evidence suggests that unions have relatively little effect on wage 
inequality among women (Lemieux  1993), and that de-unionization did 
not play a significant role in the increase in female wage inequality in the 
United States (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996). 
What  explains  this difference in  the  impact  of unions for men  and 
women? As is well known, unions typically have two offsetting effects on 
wage inequality. On the one hand, wage compression policies of unions re- 
sult in lower inequality within  the union than nonunion sector. On the other 
hand,  since unions raise  the average wage in  the union  relative to the 
nonunion sector, they may well increase the inequality between union and 
nonunion workers. Lemieux (1993) argues that this latter effect is particu- 
larly important for women, for whom unionization is concentrated in highly 
skilled public-sector jobs such as teaching, nursing, and so on. In other 
words, unions tend to increase wages for women who would have earned rel- 
atively high wages even in the absence of unions, thereby worsening this 
source of wage inequality. This between-group effect is not as important for 
union men who are not particularly skilled relative to nonunion men. 
We first illustrate the effect of unions on wage inequality by performing 
simple variance decompositions. At this stage, we ignore altogether differ- 
ences in the skill composition of the union and nonunion workforces and 
basically attribute to union wage policies the differences in the mean and 
variance of wages between the union and nonunion sectors. 
We focus on the effect of unions on the wages of union members relative 
to nonunion members. Ideally, we  would divide workers on the basis of 
whether their wages and working conditions are covered by a union con- 
tact. The U.K. data, however, are not available for this analysis. Though the 
distinction between coverage and membership is relatively minor in the 
United States, where a very large fraction of covered workers are union 
members, the distinction is more problematic in the United Kingdom. As 
a result, we may well understate the effect of unions on wage inequality by 
focusing on union members since a substantial fraction of nonmembers 
are covered by union agreements. 
As explained in the appendix, we only have data to compute the effect of 
de-unionization on wage inequality for the two countries for the period 
starting in 1983. Given our main goal of explaining the relative evolution 
of U.K. and U.S. wage inequality, we do not miss any important develop- 
22. See Freeman (1993), Card (1992), and DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) for the 
United States, and Gosling and Machin (1995) for the United Kingdom. Because of differ- 
ence in estimation methods and data, however, it is difficult to explicitly compare the quanti- 
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ments by focusing on the 1983-1998 period as it is then where the time path 
of union membership diverges between the two countries (see fig. 7.9). 
(1) 
The variance of wages can be decomposed as follows: 
var(w>  = U.var(wI U=  1) + (1 -  U>.  var(wI U=  0) 
+ U.  (1 -  U)  *  A, 
where uis  the unionization rate (actual or simulated) and A is the differ- 
ence in mean wages between the union and nonunion sectors (E[w  I U = 11 
-  E[w  I U = 01). The first two terms in equation (1 j represent the within- 
group variance; the last term represents the between-group variance. 
Table 7.4 shows the different elements of this variance decomposition. 
Consider first the case of men in part A. Rows one and two report the vari- 
ance of (log) wages in the union and nonunion sectors, respectively. As ex- 
pected, the variance of  log wages is much smaller in the union than the 
Table 7.4  Variance Decomposition of Log Hourly Wages Between and Within the Union and 
Nonunion Sectors in the United Kingdom and the United States 
United Kingdom  United States 
1983  1998  Change  1983  1998  Change 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
I. Variance in union sector 
2. Variance in nonunion sector 
3. Union wage differential 
4. Unionization rate 
5. Overall variance 
6. Variance with 1983 unionization rate 
7. “De-unionization” effect (% of total) 
1. Variance in union sector 
2. Variance in nonunion sector 
3. Union wage differential 
4. Unionization rate 
5. Overall variance 
6. Variance with 1983 unionization rate 
7. “De-unionization” effect (“h  of total) 
A.  Men 
0.139  0.180 
0.219  0.288 
0.094  0.089 
0.610  0.358 
0.172  0.251 




0.169  0.209 
0.176  0.242 
0.255  0.310 
0.456  0.330 
0.188  0.253 























































Notes: Based on hourly wages of wage and salary workers aged twenty-three to fifty-nine earning be- 
tween &I and f30 per hour (E1996) in the United Kingdom, and between $2.50 and $63.00 an hour 
($1996) in the United States. United States data are from the outgoing rotation group files of the CPS. 
United Kingdom 1983 data are from the GHS; 1998 U.K. data are from the autumn LFS. Workers are 
divided between the “union” and “nonunion” sectors on the basis of their self-reported membership to 
a trade union. The simulated variance in row six is computed using a standard variance decomposition 
formula (see table 7.5 note). 296  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
nonunion sector in both countries in both years. Interestingly, the variance 
in the union sector is almost identical in the United Kingdom and in the 
United States in the two years. By contrast, the variance in the nonunion is 
much  larger in the United  States (0.296) than in  the United  Kingdom 
(0.219) in 1983. By  1998, however, the variances are very similar in the two 
countries. Consistent  with previous  research, row three shows that the 
difference in mean wages between the union and nonunion sectors (union 
wage gap) is always positive but smaller in the United Kingdom than the 
United States.23 
The same basic wage patterns can be seen in figure 7A. 1,  which shows 
kernel density estimates of wages among union and nonunion men. The 
figure shows that, in both countries, the wage distribution is more com- 
pressed and has a higher mean in the union than in the nonunion sectors. 
The U.K. and U.S. wage distributions look remarkably similar in 1998. In 
1983, however, there is noticeably less difference between the union and 
nonunion distributions in the United Kingdom than the United States. 
The basic patterns that emerge from this figure are, therefore, consistent 
with patterns found for the variances in table 7.4. 
Row four shows that the unionization rate among men decreased much 
faster (by 25 percentage points) in the United Kingdom than in the United 
States (10 percentage-point decline). Row five reproduces the earlier find- 
ing that wage inequality-measured  by the variance of log wages in this 
case-increases  faster in the United Kingdom than in the United States. 
In row six, we compute the variance of wages that would have prevailed 
in 1983 and 1998 if the unionization rate had remained stable at its 1983 
level using the usual variance decomposition in equation (1). Column (3) 
of row six shows that the variance of U.K. wages would have increased by 
0.052 if the rate of unionization had remained stable, compared to an ac- 
tual increase of 0.079. In other words, de-unionization contributed to a 
0.027 increase in the variance of wages (row seven), which represents 34 
percent of the total change. In the United States, de-unionization accounts 
for 0.012, or 41 percent, of the 0.028 increase in the variance of wages be- 
tween 1983 and 1998. 
The results reported in part B confirm the finding of the previous litera- 
ture that unions have little effect on the wage inequality for women. Rela- 
tive to men, there is a modest difference between the variance in the union 
and the nonunion sector (rows one and two). Furthermore, the raw union 
wage gap (row three) is much larger than for men, suggesting a much larger 
23. For example, Stewart (1983) reports standard OLS estimates of the union wage gap of 
about 7 percent in the United Kingdom, compared to a range of 10 to 15 percent (Lewis 1986) 
in the United States. These  estimates are not strictly comparable  to  those reported in table 7.2, 
for which differences in characteristics between the two sectors are not controlled. In table 
7A.1, we report OLS estimatcs of the union wage gap in 1983 and 1998 for the two countries. 
For men, our union wage gap estimates range from 0.06 to 0.12 in thc United Kingdom, and 
from 0.12  to  0.17 in the United States, which is similar to the estimates reported by both Stew- 
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Table 7.5  Simulated Variance of Male Log Wages in the United Kingdom and 
United States under Different Unionization Rates 
Simulated Unionization Rate 
Actual  U.K. (61%)  U.S. (28%) 




YO  of actual difference 
0.172  0.172  0.198 
0.256  0.202  0.256 
0.084  0.030  0.058 
100  36  69 
Actual  U.K. (36%)  us.  (18%) 




YO  of actual difference 
0.251  0.251  0.270 
0.284  0.262  0.284 
0.033  0.01 1  0.014 
100  33  42 
Notes: The variances are computed using the standard-variance  decompogtion formula 
var(w) = u.  var(w1 U=  1) + (1 -  U).  var(w1 U=  0) + U.  (1 -  U)A,  where Uis theunion- 
ization rate (actual or  simulated) and A is the difference in mean wages between the union and 
nonunion sectors (~[w  I u = 11 -  ~[w  I u = 01). 
“between-group” effect, which tends to increase ineq~ality.~~  Finally, the 
decline in the rate of unionization is less than half as large for women as 
for men (row four). For all these reasons, de-unionization accounts for less 
than 5 percent of the increase in the variance of wages in either country. 
In tables 7.5 and 7.6, we provide further evidence on the effect of unions 
on male wage inequality. In table 7.5, we use equation (1) to compute the 
variance of wages under various counterfactual assumptions about the 
rate of unionization. Column (1) reports the actual variances in the two 
countries. As discussed earlier, the gap in male wage inequality between 
the two countries shrinks between 1983 and 1998: the gap in the variance 
declines from 0.084 to 0.033. Columns (2) and (3) show that a large por- 
tion of this declining gap can be attributed to differences in the unioniza- 
tion rate between the two countries. For example, column (2) shows that 
the  U.K.-U.S. difference in the variance  would  have been  three  times 
smaller if the U.S. unionization rate had been as high as that in the United 
Kingdom. Overall, this table provides additional evidence that the conver- 
gence in the unionization rate contributed to the convergence in male wage 
inequality. 
24. Table 7A.1 shows that, for women, the OLS estimates of the union wage gap are sys- 
tematically smaller than the unadjusted gaps reported in table 7.2, indicating that, even in the 
absence of unions, unionized women would have earned more than nonunionized women be- 
cause of their human capital or job characteristics. This confirms the finding in the literature 
that unions increase the between-group variance by  pushing up the wages of women who 
would have earned relatively high wages even in the absence of unions. 298  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
Table 7.6  Effect of De-Unionization on Log Hourly Wage Inequality, Adjusting for 
Composition  Effects 
Predicted in 1998 with 1983  Effect of  Effect 
1983  1998  Unionization Patterns  De-Unionization  in ‘i/o 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
A. L?  K. Men 
Unionization  61.1  35.4  58.3 
Variance  0.172  0.250  0.225  0.025  32.5 
90-10  1.025  1.275  1.208  0.067  26.8 
90-50  0.554  0.685  0.627  0.058  44.3 
50-10  0.472  0.590  0.580  0.010  8.5 
B. US.  Men 
Unionization  27.4  18.2  26.2 
Variance  0.255  0.279  0.271 
90-10  1.314  1.386  1.375 
90-50  0.602  0.699  0.693 
50-10  0.712  0.688  0.682 
0.008  33.9 
0.01 1  15.8 
0.005  5.6 
0.006  - 
Notes: The simulated measures of wage dispersion in column (3)  are computed by reweighting the 1998 
data by  the ratio of the predicted probabilities of union membership in 1983 and 1998. The predicted 
probabilities are estimated using a logit model for union membership. Explanatory variables used are a 
set of regional dummies (ten regions and London in the United Kingdom, nine regions and SMSA sta- 
tus in the United States), a dummy variable for marital status, and a set of education dummies (seven in 
the United Kingdom, five in the United States) fully interacted with a fourth-degree polynomial in age. 
United States models also include dummy variables for race and veteran status. 
One concern with the counterfactual exercises of tables 7.4  and 7.5 is that 
they may just be reflecting differences in the composition of the union and 
nonunion workforces, as opposed to true “causal” effects of unionization 
on wage inequality. For example, the variance of wages may be smaller in 
the union sector because the workforce is more homogeneous than in the 
nonunion sector, and not because unions truly compress the wage structure. 
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) suggest a simple “reweighting” 
method for controlling for differences in observable characteristics when 
modeling the distribution of wages. The basic idea is to estimate the prob- 
ability that a worker with a given set of observed characteristics xis  union- 
ized in both 1983 and 1998. Call these probabilities P,,(x) and e8(x),  re- 
spectively. The  counterfactual  distribution  of  wages  that  would  have 
prevailed in 1998 if the probability of unionization (as a function of x) had 
remained as in 1983  is obtained by reweighting observations for union and 
nonunion workers by P,,(x)/P,,(x)  and (1 -  P,,[x])/(  1 -  &Jx]),  respectively.25 
25. We estimate these probabilities using a logit model. The explanatory variables used are 
a quartic function of age fully interacted with education categories, and sets of dummy vari- 
ables for marital status, regions (ten regions and London in the United Kingdom, nine regions 
and SMSA status in the United Statcs), and dummies for race and veteran status in the United 
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Summary measures of inequality such as the variance or the 90-10 wage 
differential can then be computed from this counterfactual distribution. If 
it is the case that union workers have the same unobserved characteristics 
as nonunion workers conditional on observables, then these differences be- 
tween the actual and counterfactual distributions can be taken as measur- 
ing the causal effect of unions on wages.26 
Table 7.6 illustrates the effect of unions on male wage inequality ob- 
tained using this reweighting procedure. Columns (1) and (2) show the 
unionization rate and several measures of inequality that prevailed in 1983 
and 1998, respectively. The same numbers are recomputed from the 1998 
reweighted sample in column (3).  Note that the counterfactual unioniza- 
tion rate in 1998 is lower than in 1983. This indicates that the distribution 
of characteristics (the x’s)  have changed in a way that reduces the proba- 
bility of being unionized. 
The counterfactual measures of wage inequality in column (3) are sys- 
tematically lower than in the unadjusted  1998 distribution of column (2), 
indicating that de-unionization could have contributed to the rise in wage 
inequality even when composition effects are adjusted for. In the United 
Kingdom, the resulting effect of de-unionization on the variance of wages 
shown in column (4) (0.025) is very similar to the “na’ive”  estimate reported 
in table 7.4 (0.027). The estimates reported in table 7.6 indicate that the 
faster decline in unionization  in the United Kingdom can account for 
about a third of the U.K.-US. convergence in male wage inequality be- 
tween the two countries over the 1983-1 998 period. 
7.3.3  Other Institutional Change: Privatization 
Another reform affecting the U.K. labor market was the reduction of the 
role of the public sector as an employer. These changes occurred directly 
through  the  privatizations  of  the late  1980s and  1990s and indirectly 
through the contracting out of public-sector services. Public-sector employ- 
ment fell from 7.45 million in 1979 to 5.23  million in 1995. In addition, com- 
petitive tendering of services forced convergence of wages between the pub- 
lic and private sectors for some groups of workers. By  contrast, existing 
research indicates that the fraction of workers in the public sector has re- 
mained more or less constant in the United States during this period (see 
Poterba and Rueben 1994). 
Wages in  the public sector are more compressed in both the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Both the wage premia associated with ob- 
served skill and the wage distribution within skill groups are smaller in the 
public sector.*’ It seems plausible, therefore, that the decline in the role of 
26. This assumption is discussed in more detail below. 
27. For the United Kingdom see Disney and Gosling (1998) and table 7.7 in this chapter. 
For the United States see Poterba and Rueben (1994). 300  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
the public sector as an employer would have had an  significant effect on the 
wage distribution in the United Kingdom, especially for men. The decline 
is not as steep for women, who are more heavily concentrated in such sec- 
tors as health and education that were not directly privatized, although 
they became more integrated into the private sector over the period. 
It is important, however, to separate pure public-sector wage compres- 
sion effects from union wage compression effects. Part B of table 7.7 shows 
that union  membership and public-sector  employment are two closely 
linked phenomena. For both men and women in 1983 and 1998, the rate of 
union membership in the public sector is about 40 percentage points larger 
than in the private sector. More importantly, coverage in the public sector 
is close to 90 percent. The last four rows of table 7.7 show, however, that 
most of the difference in the wage distributions between the public and 
private sectors is a consequence of the fact that unions are more present in 
the public than the private sector. Conditional on union status, the table 
shows that the standard deviation of wages is not systematically smaller in 
the public than private sector. It is particularly clear in the case of men that 
the key  determinant of wage  inequality is union  status as opposed to 
public-sector affiliation. This means that the effect of privatization on the 
wage structure may have occurred indirectly through decreasing the likeli- 
hood that lower-paid workers would be unionized. 
The other issue is that many workers affected by changes in the state’s 
employment policy are still working in the public sector. Competitive ten- 
dering, whereby an activity stays in the public sector only if it has lower 
Table 7.7  Distribution of Workers and Wage Dispersion in the Public and Private 
Sectors in the United Kingdom 
Men  Women 
1983  1998  1983  1998 
A. Percentage of workers in the public sector 














































Nores: All statistics are computed from a sample of wage and salary workers aged twenty- 
three to fifty-nine earning between f1  and f30  per hour (f1996) from the 1983 GHS and the 
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costs than can be found in the private sector, has meant that public- and 
private-sector wages have converged. Disney and Gosling (1998) find that 
the wage distribution of low-skilled men is basically identical in the two 
sectors in the 1990s. This, when taken together with the points made in the 
paragraph above, means that the effect of privatization is going to be hard 
to uncover. In fact, when we perform the same kind of counterfactual de- 
composition for the public sector than we did for unions in table 7.6, we 
find only negligible effects on wage inequality. 
7.4  Effect of Reforms on Wage Inequality: Qualifications and Extensions 
The empirical analysis above supports the simple story. Wage inequality 
increased fastest for U.S.  women during the 1980s because of the decline in 
the minimum wage. Over the 1980s and 1990s inequality increased for men 
faster in the United Kingdom because of the decline in unionization. In 
this section we discuss some possible arguments for and against this view 
in more detail. 
7.4.1 
Our findings in section 7.3.2 can be interpreted as the causal effect of the 
reduction of unionization on wage inequality only if the unobserved char- 
acteristics of union members are the same as for workers not in unions. If 
this assumption does not hold,  then  we  cannot tell how much  of  the 
changes in wage inequality that we attribute to de-unionization are a real 
causal effect of de-unionization, as opposed to spurious consequences of 
changes in the distribution of unobservables between the union and non- 
union sectors. If workers and firms respond to incentives at all, then this 
assumption will be violated. The real question is therefore whether all the 
changes that we  attribute to unionization just reflect differences in un- 
observables. This is not testable, in general, but we believe it is unlikely for 
the following reasons. 
First, the difference between the raw effects (table 7.4) and those ob- 
tained by controlling for a large set of explanatory variables (table 7.6) is 
small. Unless unobservables play a radically different role in the determi- 
nation of the union status of workers than observables like age and educa- 
tion, failure to control for unobservables should not significantly affect the 
results. Furthermore, if selection effects are important because firms and 
workers respond to wage differentials, then we know that the true effects 
must lie somewhere greater than zero and less than the estimated effects. 
Another reason to believe that our results can be interpreted as a causal 
effect of unionization is that existing studies that have modeled more ex- 
plicitly the selection problem found that doing so did not have much im- 
pact on the estimated effect of unions on wage inequality. For example, 
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both Freeman (1993) and Card (1992) use fixed effects methods to control 
for differences in the distribution of person-specific unobservables between 
the union and nonunion sectors. They conclude that these adjusted esti- 
mates yield a very similar impact of de-unionization on the growth in U.S. 
male wage inequality than simpler cross-sectional estimates like the ones 
considered here. 
A more subtle point raised by Lewis (1986) is that these various estima- 
tors yield a causal estimate of union wage effects only under the assump- 
tion that the extent of unionization has no effect on nonunion wages. This 
assumption would be violated, however, in the presence  of “threat” or 
other general equilibrium effects. If these effects are important, we may be 
either understating  or overstating the true effect of de-unionization on 
wage inequality. For instance, Freeman (1996) has argued that, because of 
threat effects, standard estimates of the effect of de-unionization on wage 
inequality likely understate the full effect. The basic idea is that, as unions 
get weaker and the threat of  unionization weakens, nonunion firms no 
longer feel compelled to imitate the wage structure of union firms to avoid 
unionization. In this light, Gosling (1998) relates wages at the workplace 
level to the threat of unionization when the establishment was set up, con- 
ditional on fixed industry and establishment-agekohort effects. This paper 
finds the threat of unionization has a bigger effect on the dispersion of 
wages than actual union status. 
The changes in the distribution  of union and nonunion wages in the 
United Kingdom documented in Table 7.4 and figure 7A.  1 are consistent 
with this view. There is much less difference between the distributions of 
union and nonunion wages in the United Kingdom in 1983, when unions 
are quite strong, than in  1998 or in  the United States, where they are 
weaker. In other words, the fact that wage inequality in the nonunion sec- 
tor expanded so fast in the United Kingdom between 1983 and 1998 is con- 
sistent with the view that the threat of unionization  subsumed during 
this  period.  Attributing  part  of  this expansion  in  wage  inequality  to 
de-unionization would increase substantially the estimated effect of de- 
unionization on wage inequality. 
7.4.2  Comparison with Other Periods and Other Countries 
Our original motivation for looking at the effect of unions on wage in- 
equality was that male wage inequality expanded much faster in the United 
Kingdom, where the rate of unionization declined by 25 percentage points 
between 1983 and 1998, than in the United States, where it declined by less 
than 10 percentage points. This “aggregate” evidence is, in itself, inconsis- 
tent with simple selection-bias explanation. If being a union member were 
just a label for unobservable characteristics, then changes in wage inequal- 
ity should be unrelated, on  average, with changes in the rate of unionization. Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage Inequality  303 
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Fig. 7.10  U.K.-U.S. male variance gap and unionization 
We explore this aggregate evidence in more detail in figure 7.10, which 
shows the evolution of the U.K.-US. differences in unionization and in the 
variance of male wages, respectively, between  1979 and 1  998.28  Interest- 
ingly, both series exhibit a break in trend around 1983. Between 1979 and 
1983, the variance of male wages increases faster in the United States than 
in the United Kingdom, while unionization decreases at the same pace in 
the two countries. After 1983, however, U.K. unionization rates fall faster 
than in the United States while the variance of U.K. wage expands faster 
than in the United States. The coincidence in the trend breaks in the two 
series strongly supports our earlier conclusion about the role of unions in 
the relative evolution of male wage inequality in the two countries. 
A simple OLS regression of the U.K.-U.S. difference in the variance of 
wages on the difference in unionization rates yields an  estimated coefficient 
of 0.22 (with a standard error of 0.03). The R-squared from the regression 
is 0.74, suggesting that the differential evolution of unionization in the two 
countries accounts for most of the divergent trends in male wage inequal- 
ity. As in the case of the minimum-wage analysis for women illustrated in 
figure 7.8, a linear trend is not statistically significant once differences in 
unionization are controlled for. 
Taken at face value,  the estimated  aggregate  effects imply that de- 
unionization accounts for 35 percent of the 0.068 increase in the variance 
28. As in the case of women in figure 7.8, we smooth the U.K. variance of wages using a 
three-year moving average before computing the U.K.-U.S. difference in the variance of 
wages. We also use the overall rate of unionization, as opposed to the rate for men only, be- 
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ofwages in the United States between 1979 and 1998, and for 53 percent of 
the corresponding 0.097 increase in the variance in the United Kingd~m.'~ 
Another interesting observation is that, while the rate of unionization in 
1998 is quite close to the U.S. rate for 1979 (see fig. 7.9), the extent of male 
wage inequality in the United Kingdom in 1998 is also quite similar to the 
U.S. one for 1979 (see fig. 7.2). A related point is that, according to the es- 
timated regression model, the 16 percent remaining unionization rate gap 
in 1998 should translate into a 0.035 variance gap, which is very close to the 
0.04 gap observed in figure 7.10. In other words, the regression estimates 
predict that the U.K.-U.S. variance gap would basically vanish if the U.K. 
unionization rate were to decline all the way to the U.S. level. So in addi- 
tion to explaining well the dzflerentiul evolution of male wage inequality in 
the two countries, U.K.-U.S. differences in unionization also seem to ex- 
plain quite well the difference in the levels of wage inequality. 
Interestingly, these findings are qualitatively similar to those of DiNardo 
and Lemieux (1 997), who show that male wage inequality increased much 
less in the Canada than in the United States between 1981 and 1988. By 
contrast, the rate of unionization  remained  relatively stable in Canada 
while it dropped sharply in the United States during this period. Putting 
these pieces of aggregate evidence together reinforces our earlier conclu- 
sion that unionization is an important explanation for the U.K.-U.S. con- 
vergence in male wage inequality over the last two decades. 
7.4.3 
One possible objection against this aggregate evidence is that de-union- 
ization is just an endogenous consequence of more fundamental  labor 
market changes like, skill-biased technical change, that are the real under- 
lying source of increase in wage ineq~ality.~~  If this were true, however, 
then the rate of technical change (or other underlying change) must have 
been higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States, which is 
neither an appealing nor a parsimonious explanation. 
The alternative explanation we implicitly have in mind here is that at 
least some of the U.K. changes in unionization have occurred because of 
changes in the legal framework rather than changes to labor market and 
product market conditions. Under this scenario, ascribing a causal role for 
the decline in unionization is more plausible. 
As Pencavel (chap. 5 in this volume) shows, there is probably no single 
reason that unionization declined so rapidly over the 1980s and 1990s. It is, 
however, plausible that legislation (especially the employment acts of 1980 
and 1982) did have a crucial role. These acts increased the costs of union- 
Is the Decline in Unionization Exogenous? 
29. These estimates are obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficient of 0.22 by the re- 
spective declines of unionization in the United States (0.11) and the United Kingdom (0.23). 
30. See, for example, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001). Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage Inequality  305 
ization by  removing union immunities in a recognition dispute.31  Previ- 
ously, unions  could obtain  negotiating rights by  threatening to go on 
The strike weapon was still available but unions were now liable for 
monies lost by their employers as a result of the dispute. Put simply, the 
threat of a strike in this instance became less credible. Disney, Gosling, and 
Machin (1995,1996) show that it is conditions surrounding the workplace 
at set-up date rather than current conditions which determine the proba- 
bility of unionization. They also find, even after controlling for industry- 
level conditions of the labor and product markets and macro variables at 
set-up date and current establishment-level characteristics (such as size), 
that workplaces established in the 1980s are more than 16 percent less 
likely to be unionized.33  The aggregate decline carried on through the 1980s 
as the proportion  of  post-1980s  workplaces  in  the sample  increased. 
Again, this is consistent with the view that part of the decline in unioniza- 
tion was a result of the 1980s legislative changes. 
Of course, it is still possible that it is not legislation which is driving the 
downturn but another discrete jump in the cost of ~nionization.~~  This 
could be driven by  changes in the relative productivity of skilled or un- 
skilled workers, changes in technology that reduce the beneficial effects of 
collective voice, and increases in competition. The issue, then, is why these 
caused a discrete jump in 1980. A more plausible story is that the legisla- 
tive changes allowed management to respond faster to these increases in 
costs. The story for U.K. men is then that the change in the structure of de- 
mand increased wage inequality both directly and, because of the legisla- 
tive changes, indirectly through the removal of pay-setting institutions that 
increased wages at the bottom end. 
7.5  Conclusion 
This paper compares trends in male and female hourly wage inequality 
in the United Kingdom and the United States between 1979 and 1998. Our 
main finding is that the extent and pattern of wage inequality became in- 
creasingly similar in the two countries during this period. We attribute this 
convergence to US.-style reforms in the U.K. labor market. In particular, 
we argue that the much steeper decline in unionization in the United King- 
dom explains why inequality increased faster than in the United States. For 
women, we conclude that the fall and subsequent recovery in the real value 
of the U.S.  minimum wage explains why wage inequality increased faster in 
31. A union is “recognized” when it has negotiating rights with the employer for determin- 
32. Up until July 2000, employers were under no obligation to negotiate with unions even 
33. This 1980s “shift” effect was the only establishment-cohort variable to be significant in 
34. See again Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001). 
ing pay and conditions of employment. 
if all of their employees wanted it. 
both statistical and quantitative terms. 306  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
the United States than in the United Kingdom during the 1980s, while the 
opposite happened during the 1990s. Interestingly, the introduction of the 
National Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom in 1999  also contributed 
to the convergence in labor market institutions and wage inequality be- 
tween the two countries. 
Appendix 
U.K. Data 
The most consistent source of information on the distribution of hourly 
wages in the United Kingdom is the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), 
which has collected detailed information on weekly earnings and weekly 
hours of work on a consistent basis since 1966. One limitation of the FES, 
however, is that it contains no information on educational achievement be- 
fore 1978,  and only limited information from 1978  An alternative data 
set that provides more detailed information on educational achievement is 
the General Household Survey (GHS), which has collected information on 
earnings and hours since 1974.3h  Unfortunately, as hours are not measured 
in a consistent fashion over time, it is not possible to use the GHS to con- 
struct a consistent measure of hourly wage rates over the 1980s and 1990s. 
Another limitation of the FES is that it does not contain direct informa- 
tion on the union status of  worker^.^' This information is available, however, 
in the 1983 GHS, which also contains information on whether individuals 
work in the public or private sector. More recently, the Labour Force Sur- 
vey (LFS) has been collecting detailed information on wages, union status, 
and public-sector affiliation each year for the mid- and late 1990s. The LFS 
is very similar to the U.S. Current Population Survey in terms of its pur- 
pose-measuring  labor market activity and unemployment in a timely fa- 
shion-and  sample size. The sample sizes are also considerably larger in the 
LFS (around 15,000  wage and salary workers per quarter) than in the FES 
or the GHS (around 5,000 wage and salary workers per year). 
In light of the strengths and weaknesses of the different data sets, we use 
a “multiple data set” approach for the United Kingdom. More precisely, 
35. The FES provides limited information on school-leaving age but no information on the 
highest educational degree obtained. Gosling, Machin, and Meghir (2000) argue that the lim- 
ited information about educational achievement available in the FES is, nevertheless, suffi- 
cient for capturing main trends in relative wages by education level. 
36. See Gosling, Machin, and Meghir (2000) for more detail on the strengths and weak- 
nesses of the GHS and FES. 
37. The FES does contain a variable indicating whether the respondent has deductions 
from his or her earnings for the payment of union dues. Although this is highly correlated with 
the union status of workers at one point in time, changes in the way union members pay their 
fees over the 1980s and 1990s has meant that it is not a good measure of changes over time. Labor Market Reforms and Changes in Wage Inequality  307 
we compute the basic trends in wage inequality using the FES for 1978 to 
1996 supplemented with the autumn LFS for 1997 and 1998. We analyze 
the effect of unionization and public-sector affiliation on wage inequality 
using the 1983 GHS and the 1998 LFS. Note that we have adjusted the 
1997 and 1998 measures of wage dispersion reported in table  7.1 and 
figures 7.1 and 7.3 to ensure that there are no discrepancies in the series be- 
cause of data differences. More precisely, we compute adjustment factors 
(which we apply to the 1997 and 1998 LFS) that are such that measures of 
wage dispersion in the 1996 LFS and 1996 FES are identical. 
Following the existing literature on inequality in the United Kingdom, 
we also limit the analysis to workers aged twenty-three to fifty-nine. Real 
wages are obtained by  deflating nominal wages with the Consumption 
Price Index (Retail Price Index). To limit the effect of outliers, we keep only 
those observations with an hourly wage rate between &I and &30  (in 1996 
pounds). Note that throughout the 1978 to 1998 period, there is always less 
than 1 percent of observations with wages that are either larger than 530 or 
smaller than 51. As discussed below, one additional reason for trimming 
the wage data above &30  is to make the U.K. data more comparable with 
the U.S. data, for which weekly earnings are top-coded. 
U.S. Data 
Since 1979, the U.S. Census Bureau has been collecting data on weekly 
hours, weekly earnings, and hourly earnings (for workers paid by the hour) 
for all workers in the “outgoing rotation group” of the Current Population 
Survey (CPS). Beginning in  1983, the outgoing rotation groups supple- 
ment of the CPS also asks about the union status of workers. Since the 
questions about wages, hours, and union status are asked at every month, 
the resulting merged outgoing rotation group (MORG) files of the CPS 
provide very large samples (around 150,000 workers per year) of wage and 
salary workers from 1979 to 1999. Our U.S. analysis entirely relies on this 
data source. 
Throughout the 1979 to 1999 period, workers paid by  the hour were 
asked their hourly rates of pay. We use this variable, which is collected in a 
consistent fashion over time, as our measure of the hourly wage rate for 
these workers. The MORG files of the CPS also provide information on 
usual weekly earnings for all workers. For workers not paid by the hour, we 
use average hourly earnings (weekly earnings divided by weekly hours) as 
our measure of the wage rate. 
Note, however, that weekly earnings are not measured in a consistent 
fashion over time. From 1979 to 1993, this variable was collected by di- 
rectly asking individuals about their earnings on a weekly basis. From 1994 
to 1999, individuals had the option of reporting their usual earnings on 
the base period of their choice (weekly, biweekly, monthly, or annually). 
Weekly earnings are then obtained by normalizing the earnings reported 308  Amanda Gosling and Thomas Lemieux 
Table 7A.1  OLS Estimates of the Union Wage Gap in the United Kingdom and the 
United States 
United Kingdom  United States 
Adjusted Gap  Adjusted Gap 
Adj. for  Adj. for  Adj. for  Adj. for 
Unadjusted  Human  Human Capital  Unadjusted  Human  Human Capital 
Gap  Capital  &Job  Char.  Gap  Capital  &Job  Char. 
(1 1  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Men 
1983  0.094  0.124 
(0.012) 
1998  0.089  0.083 
(0.010) 
Women 
1983  0.255  0.184 
(0.013) 










0.150  0.162 
(0.004) 
0.138  0.118 
(0.005) 
0.238  0.195 
(0.004) 










Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the log of  hourly wages. Sample used in the 
estimation includes wage and salary workers aged twenty-three to fifty-nine earning between f1  and f30 
per hour (f1996) in the United Kingdom, and between $2.50 and $63.00 per hour ($1996) in the United 
States. United States data are from the outgoing rotation group files of the CPS. United Kingdom 1983 
data are from the GHS; 1998 U.K. data are from the autumn LFS. Workers are divided between the 
“union” and “nonunion” sectors on the basis of their self-reported membership to a trade union. The 
“human capital” controls used in columns (2),  (3),  (5),  and (6) include education-categories dummies 
(five in the United States, seven in the United Kingdom), region dummies (ten regions and London in 
the United Kingdom, nine regions and SMSA status in the United States), a quartic in age, marital sta- 
tus, and dummy variables for nonwhites (US. only) and veteran status (US.  men only). “Job character- 
istics” controls in column (3) include nine industry dummies, twelve occupation dummies, a dummy 
variable for public-sector affiliation, and dummy variables for firm size and seniority. Job characteristics 
controls in column (6)  include forty-six industry dummies and forty-five occupation dummies. Abbrevi- 
ations are explained in text. 
by workers to a weekly basis. The available evidence does not suggest, how- 
ever, that this change in the way earnings are collected had a significant im- 
pact on the distribution of wages.38 
A potentially more important problem is that weekly earnings are top- 
coded at different values for different periods throughout the sample pe- 
riod. Before 1988, weekly earnings were top-coded at $999. The top-code 
was later increased to $1,923 in 1988 and $2,884 in 1998. In real terms, the 
top-code was more than twice as small in 1988 as in 1998. Consequently, a 
much larger fraction of workers had their earnings top-coded in 1988 than 
in 1998. 
We adjust for top-coding by using the 1998 distribution of weekly earn- 
ings to impute earnings in the other years where the top-code is lower. Let 
38. Once the data have been trimmed for outliers and adjusted for top-coding, there is no 
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Fig. 7A.1  Union and nonunion wage densities (U.K. 651996, U.S. in $1996) 
tc, represent the earnings top-code in year t in real terms, andA(f;(y)  repre- 
sent the density of weekly earnings (not top-coded) in that year. Consider 
the assumption that the earnings distribution in year t between the top- 
code and the higher year  1998 top-code is the same as in 1998, i.e., that 
f;(y  I tc, <  y < tc,,)  =f,,(y  I tc, <  y <  tc,,). Under this assumption, the em- 
pirical distribution of earnings between tct and tc,, in 1998 can be used to 
impute earnings in year t. While it is common to impute a fixed value of 
earnings to all top-coded observations, doing so removes all the earnings 
variability over the top-code, which in turn understates the extent of over- 
all wage variability measured using the standard deviation or other distri- 
butional measures.39  In practical terms, we stochastically impute earnings 
above the top-code by drawing at random from the empirical 1998 distri- 
bution between tc, and t~,,.~~ 
One final adjustment we make is to trim observations with wages above 
39. In terms of between and within-group variation of earnings above and below the top- 
code, standard imputation amount to assuming there is no within-group variation above the 
top-code. 
40. A  similar approach  is used by  DiNardo, Fortin,  and Lemieux (1996), who use  a 
reweighting procedure to allocate values above the top-code. They also allow for the fact that 
the distribution of earnings depends on standard characteristics such as age, education, and 
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$50 and below $2 in 1989 dollars (approximately $2.5 and $63.0 in 1996 
dollars). Once top-coding has been adjusted for, less than 1 percent of ob- 
servations fall outside this range in any single year. We noticed that when 
wage observations are not trimmed, there is an unusual jump in most mea- 
sures of wage inequality between  1993 and 1994. We conjecture that the 
new survey instrument used to collect weekly wages since 1994 may have 
introduced more measurement error than before 1994. 
For the sake of comparability with the United Kingdom, all wage mea- 
sures presented in the paper are deflated using the CPI. Other studies have 
used  a GDP deflator  for personal consumption expenditures to deflate 
wages, in part because of concerns that changes in the CPI are biased up- 
ward, which understates real wage growth. Unless the bias is different in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, however, this should not affect 
comparisons of real wage growth between the two countries. All the U.S. 
wage statistics reported in the paper are also weighted using the CPS earn- 
ings ~eights.~' 
Questions about educational achievement were changed substantially 
in the early 1990s. Until 1991, the CPS asked about the highest grade (or 
years of schooling) completed. Starting in 1992, the CPS moved to ques- 
tions about the highest degree. To keep a relatively consistent measure of 
education  over  time,  we  measure education  using five categories (high 
school dropout, high school graduate, some postsecondary degree below a 
university bachelor's degree, university bachelor's degree, and postgradu- 
ate degree). 
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